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CRITICAL COMPARISONS:
THE ROLE OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
VALENTINA VADI*
A rose is a rose is an onion
Ernest Hemingway, For Whom the Bell Tolls (1940)
Both comparativists and internationalists have mostly neglected the interaction
between international law and comparative law. While "[i]nternationalists seem
comfortable with power and uncomfortable with culture . . . comparativists are
eager for cultural understanding and wary of involvement with governance.
However, this attitude is gradually changing, as comparativists and
internationalists have increasingly acknowledged that they "share more than they
realize. ,2 This article aims to scrutinize the interplay between international
investment law and comparative law. This interaction has four different but related
dimensions: comparative investment law, comparative arbitration law, legal
doctrine, and treaty interpretation. While authors have extensively studied
comparative investment law and comparative arbitration law, which study the
different national legislations regulating foreign investment and the arbitral
process, investment law scholarship and arbitral tribunals' use of comparative law
has received scarce, if any, attention.
While the use of comparative legal reasoning in investment law jurisprudence and
legal scholarship seems to offer concrete solutions to emerging conceptual
dilemmas and reputed scholars have forcefully argued in favor of it, one may
question whether a more critical approach to the use of comparative law should be
adopted. It is often assumed that comparative law is a neutral process, but this is
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University of Keele on September 8t , 2009 and at the International Economic Law session of the
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1. David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International
Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 545, 633 (1997).
2. Id. at 557.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
not always the case. Problems of perspective are a central element in the
comparative law discourse. This study focuses on the interplay between
international investment law and comparative law and proposes the adoption of a
critical method Not only would such awareness limit eventual abuses of the
comparative method, but it would also favour the coherence of the international
legal system as a whole.
I. INTRODUCTION
Not many fields of law use comparative law as extensively as international
arbitration. International arbitration is a method for settling transnational disputes,
involving parties and adjudicators of different nationalities, and requiring the
application of different sets of procedural and substantive norms. For its intrinsic
characteristics, international arbitration constitutes the Walhalla for comparative
law experts, and indeed, an eminent arbitrator, Professor Pierre Lalive, has recently
recognized that "the main duty of the international arbitrator is to be open to other
cultures" and that "[i]n order for international arbitrators to avoid culture clashes,
universities should start training law students much more in international and
comparative law."3 In a previous study he affirmed that "an international
arbitration should be decided by a truly 'international' arbitrator, i.e. someone who
is more than a national lawyer, someone who is internationally-minded, trained in
comparative law and inclined to adopt a comparative and truly 'international
outlook. '
4
While many comparative lawyers have therefore analyzed international
arbitration through comparative law lenses, 5 investment treaty arbitration has
received scarce if any attention. This neglect may be due to several interlinked
reasons. First, investment-treaty arbitration is often associated with international
arbitration. Second, the boom of investment disputes has only a very recent
pedigree. Consequently, only recently have authors analyzed the phenomenon of
investment treaty arbitration. Third, given the relative scarcity of legal doctrine, it
is logical that comparative law scholars have not had the necessary inputs to start
scrutinizing this particular area of public international law.
However, some have highlighted the distinction between investment treaty
arbitration and international commercial arbitration.6  While international
3. Sarah Dookhun, Q&A with Professor Pierre Lalive, 3 GLOBAL ARBITRATION REVIEW 5, 3
(2008), available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Mvedia/lectures/pdf/Lalive-QandA.pdf (emphasis added).
4. Pierre Lalive, On the Neutrality of the Arbitrator and of the Place of Arbitration, in RECUEIL
DE TRAVAUX SUISSES SUR L'ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL 23, 27 (Claude Reymond & Eugene Bucher
eds., 1984) (emphasis added).
5. JEAN-FRAN0OIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION v-vi (Stephen V. Berti & Annette Ponti trans., 2d ed. 2007); JULIAN LEW ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2-3 (2003); see also Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Two-Way Mirror: International Arbitration as Comparative Procedure, 7 MICH. Y.B. INT'L
LEGAL STUD. 163 (1985) (deeming international arbitration as an exercise in comparative procedure).
6. See Nigel Blackaby, Investment Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration (or the Tale of the
Dolphin and the Shark), in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 217, 217-19
(Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2006); Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration is Not
Arbitration, 2 STOCKHOLM INT'L ARB. REV. 1 (2008) available at http://www.arbitration-
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arbitration generally involves private parties and concerns disputes of a
commercial nature, investment treaty arbitration involves states and private actors.7
This "diagonal" dispute settlement mechanism is a major novelty in international
law since international disputes have traditionally involved states only.8 In this
sense, investment arbitration represents a successful means to ensure access to
justice at the international level. Because of the peculiar character of investment
treaty arbitration and the recent proliferation of investment disputes, the role of
comparative law in investment treaty arbitration requires an autonomous analysis. 9
This scrutiny is not only theoretically interesting but also concretely useful in light
of the increasing criticisms on investment treaty arbitration. Investment treaty
disputes mainly involve public law adjudication and may have a deep impact on
public welfare. Some authors have pointed out the inadequacies of arbitration,
which is historically rooted in private law, to deal with disputes involving public
law.10 This essay aims at exploring the role that comparative law may play in
investment treaty arbitration and questions whether the use of comparative law
may help solve some aspects of the "legitimacy crisis" of investment treaty
arbitration.1
The argument shall proceed as follows: First, the characteristics of
investment-treaty arbitration shall be highlighted. Second, this contribution will
scrutinize some essential features of the comparative method. Only by knowing the
merits and limits of the comparative method can interpreters and adjudicators
make an appropriate use of it. Third, this study focuses on the interplay between
international investment law and comparative law. While several studies have
icca.org/media/0/12331138275470/siar_2008-2saulsson.pdf; Giuditta Cordero Moss, Commercial
Arbitration and Investment Arbitration: Fertile Soil for False Friends?, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY-ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 782, 782-84
(Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).
7. Moss, supra note 6, at 784-93.
8. Paulsson, supra note 6, at 5-6.
9. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2006 - FROM
DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT at 29, U.N. Sales No.
E.06.II.D.11 (2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2006 en.pdf. According to the
UNCTAD, a total of 226 investment treaty arbitrations had been brought during the period 1987-2006.
The number of investor state arbitrations, however, is only approximate, because disputes might be
unknown because of the confidentiality requirements. About two thirds of these arbitrations have been
filed since the beginning of 2002 alone.
10. Gus Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007).
11. Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy
of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 473 (2009) (discussing the "legitimacy crisis"
of investment treaty arbitration); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1521, 1521 (2005); M. Sornarajah, A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES LAW 39 (Karl P.
Sauvant ed., 2008); Joachim Karl, International Investment Arbitration: A Threat to State Sovereignty?,
in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 225, 232-38 (Wenhua Shan et al.
eds., 2008); Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World. A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under
the Specter ofNeoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419 (2000).
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focused on what may be called comparative investment law, 12 much less attention
has been paid to the use of comparative law within investment treaty arbitration.
This phenomenon deserves close scrutiny because investment treaty tribunals use
the comparative method in their reasoning. Arbitral tribunals refer to the
jurisprudence of other international courts and tribunals, the precedents of other
investment tribunals, 13 or even to national precedents. The paper will assess the
functioning of such a "judicial borrowing" and conclude with some reflections on
the important role that comparative law may play in "legitimizing" investment
treaty arbitration. By furthering the judicial dialogue among international courts
and tribunals, legal transplants may constitute a key element to insert human rights
considerations into investment treaty arbitration, and have the potential for
ultimately promoting the humanization of international law.
II. INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
While international investment law is one of the most ancient areas of public
international law, investment treaty arbitration is a recent phenomenon. 14 When the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was first
established in 196615 it was hardly foreseen that it would in due course become one
of the most active international tribunals, before which there are now more than
130 cases pending. 16 None could predict that investment treaty arbitration would
move "from a matter of peripheral academic interest to a matter of vital
international concern., 17 Most contemporary investment treaties include investor-
state arbitration for the settlement of disputes which may arise between the foreign
investor and the host state.18 Under this mechanism, foreign investors may bring
12. See infra Section IV.
13. There is no such rule as binding precedent in international law. See Statute of the International
Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/
index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0 (stating that a "decision of the Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.") [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
14. See Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3,
Decision on Jurisdiction (Nov. 27, 1985), 3 ICSID Rep. 131 (1995) (upholding the validity of an ICSID
clause under Egyptian law); see also ANDREW NEWCOMBE AND LLULS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE
OF INVESTMENT TREATIES -STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 45 (2009) (explaining that the Chad-Italy BIT
marked "the true beginning of modem BIT practice" and gives an accurate historical overview).
15. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States arts. 1-3, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
16. List of Pending Cases, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtsRH&actionVal=ListPending
(last visited Sep. 24, 2010).
17. Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 435, 435 (2009).
18. See David Sedlak, ICSID's Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration: Can the
Momentum Hold?, 23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 147 (2004) (arguing that investor-state arbitration has
become a standard feature in international investment treaties since the 1980's, and such mechanism has
been used increasingly. From 1995 to 2004 ICSID registered four times as many claims as in the
previous 30 years and the growth rate appears increasing in the last five years. The ICSID renaissance is
probably due to economic globalization and the proliferation of investment treaties. There seems to be a
parallel growth in other fora, but data is not available because of the confidentiality requirements. Also,
some disputes may be unknown because settled before registration).
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claims against the host state before international arbitral tribunals. 19 This
development has transformed the landscape of modem investment protection,20 as
customary international law did not confer such a right to individuals.21 Similarly,
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaties and investment treaties that
pre-dated the establishment of the ICSID only provided for State-to-State
disputes. 22 In contrast with this traditional paradigm of states as the only subjects
of international law and the only ones having the capacity to raise international
claims against other states in legal proceedings, modem investment treaties do not
require the intervention of the home state in the furtherance of the dispute.23
Private companies no longer depend on the discretion of their home states in the
context of diplomatic protection as to whether a claim should be raised against
another state.24
Suggestively described as "arbitration without privity, 25  the
internationalization of investment disputes guarantees a neutral forum and has thus
been conceived as an important valve for adequately recognizing and protecting
the assets of foreign investors from expropriation, host state nationalization or
other forms of regulation. Through arbitration clauses the host state signatory to
the treaty agrees in advance to arbitrate disputes, at the investor's initiative, over
the treaty meaning and application.26 Such clauses are to some degree necessary to
render meaningful the more substantive investment treaty provisions. By
themselves, treaty based provisions are meaningless if they are not accompanied
by an effective dispute settlement mechanism. As the late Professor Thomas Walde
once held, "it is the ability to access a tribunal outside the sway of the host state
which is the principal advantage of a modem investment treaty . . . . The
effectiveness of substantive rights is ... linked to the availability of an effective
enforcement . . . . Right and procedural remedy, are, in practical and effective
terms, one."27
19. Id. at 153-54.
20. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 5 (2007); JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3
(2005).
21. See JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 1-15 (1999); see also Peter Muchlinski, The Diplomatic
Protection of Foreign Investors: A Tale of Judicial Caution, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY-ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 341 (Christina Binder et al. eds.,
2009).
22. Herman Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 805, 805 (1957).
23. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 14, at 44-45.
24. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 61-84 (2000);
Karl-Heinz Bickstiegel, Arbitration of Foreign Investment Disputes- An Introduction, in NEW
HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND BEYOND 125, 125-31 (Albert Jan van
den Berg ed., 2005).
25. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 232,
256 (1995), available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12254614477540/jasparticle - arbitr
ation withoutjirivity.pdf.
26. B~ckstiegel, supra note 24, at 126.
27. Thomas Walde, The "Umbrella" (or Sanctity of Contract/Pacta sunt Servanda) Clause in
2010
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Importantly, the paradigm shift is significant in a further respect. In investor-
state arbitration there is a transfer of adjudicative authority from national courts to
arbitral tribunals. In this sense, it has been argued that access to investor-state
arbitration shares many characteristics of the direct right of action before human
rights courts.28 However, arbitral tribunals do not only constitute an additional
forum with respect to State courts, but also an alternative to the same. 29 Thus, not
only can foreign investors seek another decision after an eventual recourse to the
national courts, but they are not required to exhaust local remedies prior to
pursuing an international legal claim. This is in stark contrast to international
human rights treaties which require that claimants exhaust local remedies in the
first instance. 30 Even where contracts between an enterprise and a state expressly
limit recourse to local dispute settlement options, claimants can directly surmount
national jurisdictions and bring investment claims to arbitral tribunals in situations
where the investor's home state and the host state have a BIT in place.31 Under
most investment treaties, states have waived their sovereign immunity and have
agreed to give arbitrators comprehensive jurisdiction over what are essentially
regulatory disputes. Indeed, investment treaty arbitration encompasses the full
panoply of the state's regulatory relations with foreign investors. As a result, some
have pointed out that investment treaty arbitration would replace judicial organs
with private adjudicators in matters of public law.32
Since investment arbitration presents characteristics similar to those in a
typical international commercial arbitration, these features may become
Investment Arbitration: A Comment on Original Intentions and Recent Cases, 1 TRANSNAT'L DisP.
MGMT 4, 13 (2004); Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Enterprise v. State: The New David and Goliath? - The
Clayton Utz Lecture, 23 ARB. INT'L 93 (2007) (noting that the traditional David-Goliath relationship
between private investors and states has been replaced, at least procedurally, by a level playing field
and that in some circumstances, private claimants, as large multinational companies, may well have
more resources available than small state being a respondent).
28. See ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 1-10 (2009)
(Describing the similarity between the situation of private persons claiming international protection of
human rights before the ECtHR, private enterprises hold individual procedural and substantive rights in
international investment law); see Clara Reiner & Christoph Schreuer, Human Rights and International
Investment Arbitration, Human Rights in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 82-97,
94 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2009).
29. See DOUGLAS, supra note 28, at 9.
30. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Human Rights Treaty Bodies - Individual
Communications, Procedure for complaints by individuals under the human rights treaties,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/individual.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
31. Several recent ICSID cases have upheld jurisdiction to hear treaty claims, notwithstanding the
fact that the foreign investor was party to a contract which specified that contract claims would be the
exclusive province of a given domestic court. See Compafilia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi
Universal v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Annulment Decision, 119 (July 3, 2002), 41
I.L.M. 1135, 1159 (2002), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/vivendi annulEN.pdf; CMS
Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/O1/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, (July 17,
2003), 42 I.L.M. 788, 808 (2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/cms-argentina"000.pdf;
Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom. ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, 40-62 (Oct. 12, 2005), available
at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Noble.pdf.
32. See Gus Van Harten, The Public-Private Distinction in the International Arbitration of
Individual Claims Against the State, 56 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 371, 383 (2007).
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problematic with regard to regulatory disputes.33 For instance, the parties
determine the composition of the arbitral tribunal.34 Although the right to choose
an arbitrator may be considered the very essence of arbitration,35 this may be
problematic from a public policy perspective. As an author highlights, while
"arbitrators... are expected to be both independent of the party appointing them
and impartial ...it is usually conceded that without violating in any way this
theoretical obligation of independence, the arbitrator may quite acceptably share
the nationality, or political or economic philosophy, or 'legal culture' of the party
who has nominated him -and may therefore be supposed from the very beginning
to be 'sympathetic' to that party's contentions or 'favorably disposed' to its
positions. 36 In a sense, independence and neutrality very much depend on the
personality of the arbitrator.
Confidentiality is another feature of the arbitral process. Hearings are held in
camera and final awards may not be published, depending on the parties' will.
Even the names of the parties and much less the details of the dispute may not be
disclosed.38 While confidentiality well suits commercial disputes, the same may be
problematic in investor-state arbitration. The lack of transparency may hamper
efforts to track investment treaty disputes, to monitor their frequency, their
settlement and to assess the policy implications that flow thereby.39 In recent years,
some efforts to make investment arbitration more transparent have been
undertaken in different fora. In response to calls from civil society groups, the
three parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) - Canada, the
US, and Mexico - have pledged to disclose all NAFTA arbitrations and open future
arbitration hearings to the public.40 Similarly, the ICSID Rules provide for the
33. Blackaby, supra note 6.
34. Pierre Lalive, Conclusions, in THE ARBITRAL PROCESS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF
ARBITRATORS 119, 123
(1991).
35. See id.
36. Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 485, 506-07 (1997).
37. Arbitrators have clear incentives to adopt a high level standard of conduct because of
reputation. See Andreas Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies:
Some Reflections, TEX. INT'L L.J. 59 (1995).
38. For instance, Article 46 of the 2010 Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce provides that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the SCC
Institute and the Arbitral Tribunal shall maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration and the award.
Arb. Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Arb. Rules of the Arb. Inst. of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce art. 46 (Jan. 1, 2010), available at http://www.sccinstitute.com/skilje
domsregler-4.aspx.
39. Because investment disputes are settled using a variety of arbitral rules-not all of which
provide for public disclosure of claims-there can be no accurate accounting of all such disputes. That
some portion of the iceberg remains hidden from view should be a matter of concern given the public
policy implications of such disputes. Luke Eric Peterson, Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Development Policy-Making, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 15 (2004), available at http://www.ii
sd.org/pdf/2004/trade bits.pdf.
40. See, NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Joint Statement, Montreal (Oct. 7, 2003),
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/Statement.
aspx?lang=eng (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
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public disclosure of the dispute proceedings under their auspices.4 1 Increasingly,
investment arbitration tribunals have allowed public interest groups to present
amicus curiae briefs or have access to the arbitral process. These important moves,
however, involve the conduct of the proceedings of a limited number of investment
disputes. Indeed, the vast majority of existing treaties do not mandate such
transparency, which means that most of the proceedings are resolved behind closed
doors.
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, awards rendered against host states
are, in theory, readily enforceable against host state property worldwide, due to the
widespread adoption of the New York and Washington (ICSID) Conventions.42
The decisions have only limited avenues for revision and cannot be amended by
the domestic legal system or a supreme court.43 Arbitration under the ICSID rules
is wholly exempted from the supervision of local courts, with awards subject only
to an internal annulment process.
44
Some important issues arise in this context. On the one hand, it seems that the
current framework lacks adequate procedural protection for the public interest.
According to some authors, investment treaty law and arbitration would be facing
a "legitimacy crisis, '45 as "private tribunals consider legal issues that impact the
international economy, public policy and international relations, but they do so in a
vacuum."46 On the other hand, there is uncertainty over the relevance or
irrelevance of norms external to investment law within investment treaty
arbitration. Furthermore, notwithstanding the substantive similarity of investment
treaty provisions, arbitral tribunals have come to inconsistent decisions on the
meaning of international law norms. Inconsistent arbitral awards create legal
uncertainty and undermine the coherence of the international legal system.
While developing countries have deemed investment treaty arbitration
politically biased against them, 47 emerging economies and industrialized countries
41. ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, Int'l Ctr. For Settlement of Inv. Disputes, at 66
(Apr. 2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ ICSID /ICSID/ RulesMain.jsp.
42. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 1,
June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]; ICSID Convention, supra note 15,
art. 54.
43. New York Convention, supra note 42, art. 6; ICSID Convention, supra note 15, art. 53.
44. ICSID Convention, supra note 15, art. 53. The ICSID annulment process provides for a very
limited review. ICSID annulment committees only have the ability to annul awards and send them back
to the tribunal or to a new tribunal for a new decision, but cannot replace the decision with their own.
The grounds for annulment are very narrow and concern due process issues: the tribunal was not
properly constituted, it manifestly exceeded its powers, there was corruption on the part of a member,
there was a fundamental serious departure from a procedural rule, or the award did not state the reasons
on which it was based.
45. On the "legitimacy crisis" of investor-state arbitration, see supra note 11.
46. Franck, supra note 11, at 1521.
47. Shalakany, supra note 11. More recently, the Bolivian President Evo Morales affirmed that
Bolivia "emphatically reject[s] the legal, media and diplomatic pressure of some multinationals that...
resist the sovereign rulings of countries, making threats and initiating suits in international arbitration,"
adding that "The governments of Latin America ... never win the cases." Latin Leftists Mull Quitting
World Bank Arbitrator, REUTERS, Apr. 30, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldnews/idUSN29
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alike have expressed some concerns about this mechanism. For instance, Australia
has not been at ease with the idea of investment-related arbitrations, and the
investment chapter of the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement leaves out
provisions on investor-state dispute resolution. 8 In the European Union (EU), the
compatibility of the current investment law and EU law is highly debated. The
criticisms concern alleged discriminatory treatment of investors and a perceived
lack of control by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) due to arbitration.49 Turning
our attention to developing countries, Bolivia and Ecuador sent a formal notice to
ICSID declaring their withdrawal from the ICSID Convention and their intention
to pursue revisions to their BITs in order to direct investors' claims solely to
domestic fora. 0 These moves may be due to contingent political reasons.51
Furthermore, the fear of expensive investment disputes may be an additional
reason for withdrawal. However, these moves may also indicate a deeper
dissatisfaction with how the system works.
Before addressing these criticisms, two preliminary observations may be
made. First, it seems that the emerging criticisms on the functioning of investment
treaty arbitration in relation to public goods are evidence of the vitality of the
system. The recent boom of investment treaty arbitrations, as well as the
willingness of states to participate in the system, explain such vitality. For
instance, the EU Member states are willing to maintain the network of BITs that
exists between them despite the above-mentioned concerns of the European
Commission.52 Indeed, EU states believe that their investors are better protected
36448520070430.
48. William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement between Developed Countries:
Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 2
(2006).
49. Opinion of the Advocate General Poiares Maduro, delivered on July 10, 2008, Comm'n of the
European Communities. v Republic of Austria, Case No. C-205/06, 2009 E.C.R. 1-01301, and Comm'n
of the European Communities. v Kingdom of Sweden, Case No. C-249/06 , 2009 2 C.M.L.R. 49,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62006CO205:EN:HTML.
50. International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID News Release, Bolivia
Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, May 16, 2007, http://icsid.world
bank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=Announceme
ntsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement3; International Center for Settlement
of Investment Disputes, ICSID News Release, Ecuador Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID
Convention, July 9, 2009, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH
&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=A
nnouncement20.
51. For instance, in the case of the US Australia FTA, the parties have shown reciprocal trust of
the respective national courts. Andrew L. Stoler, AUSFTA as "Third Wave" Trade Agreement: Beyond
the WTO Envelope, Address at the 26th International Trade Law Conference, at 5, (Sept. 23, 2004),
available at http://www.iit.adelaide.edu.au/conf/AGC92304_ausfta SpD.pdf. In the case of Bolivia and
Ecuador, the withdrawal from ICSID may be due to the nationalization drive in the Andean gas sector
which is firmly supported by the poorest indigenous minorities. See Marco E. Schnabl & Julie Bddard,
The Wrong Kind of 'Interesting': The Investment Climate in Latin America Recalls a Certain Chinese
Proverb, NAT'L L.J., July 30, 2007, available at http://www.arbitralwomen.org/files/publication/
1910231238362.pdf.
52. The European Commission fears that such parallel regime may create legal uncertainty and
forum shopping in favour of arbitration. Damon Vis-Dumbar, EU Member States Reject the Call to
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under the BITs than under EU law alone.53 Second, the emerging critiques should
constitute the steppingstones for the progressive development of the system.
54
These criticisms need to be taken into account to allow the investment treaty
system to evolve in a harmonious way. Comparative law is an element that can
make it easier for the public good to be taken into account in investment treaty
arbitration.
III. COMPARATIVE LAW AND METHOD
Before exploring the role the comparative method plays in the context of
investment treaty law and arbitration, it is worth scrutinizing the main
characteristics of comparative law. In a preliminary way, two questions need to be
addressed. The first question relates to the essence of comparative law: is
comparative law a legal discipline or should it be considered a mere legal method?
The second question, which is strictly related to the first, is about the objectives of
comparative law. Due to space limits, this section does not purport to exhaustively
describe what the comparative method does and what those employing it should do
to use it properly. The very existence of comparative law as a legal discipline has
been contested because of lack of agreement among scholars on the appropriate
use of analogy in legal context. The main assumption of this paper is that the
controversial nature of comparative law does not repress its legal nature; by way of
contrast, the awareness of its limits and merits may only benefit legal analysis. In
this sense, while it is not possible to offer a prescriptive analysis of comparative
law - because the same comparative law scholars have different views on the
method of comparative law - this section aims to offer some insights on the
essence of comparative law, its modus operandi, and its purposes.
Comparative law has been defined as "an intellectual activity with law as its
object and comparison as its process. 56 Notwithstanding the apparent clarity of
this definition, there has been a fierce debate among scholars with regard to the
essence of comparative law. While some authors have qualified comparative law
as an autonomous discipline, others have contended that comparative law
Terminate Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties, INV. TREATY NEWS, Feb. 10, 2009,
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/02/1 /eu-member-states-reject-the-call-
to-terminate-intra-eu-bilateral-investment-treaties.aspx.
53. Id. Provisions like the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard do not appear in national
legislations or even in EC law. Other provisions, such as those concerning expropriation may be stricter
in investment treaties than in national laws. More importantly, investment treaty arbitration is a
procedural guarantee that EU law does not provide for. Granting investors an independent right to
initiate dispute settlement directly against the host state instead of forcing them to rely either on
domestic courts or on inter state dispute resolution is one of the major 'virtues' of international
investment law.
54. See Anne Van Aaken, Perils of Success? The Case of International Investment Protection, 9
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REv. 1 (2008).
55. Francisco Orrego Vicufia, Carlos Calvo, Honorary NAFTA Citizen, 11 N.Y.U. ENVT'L. L.J.
19, 32-34 (2002).
56. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 2 (Tony Weir,
trans., 3rd ed. 1998).
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amounted to the mere utilization of the comparative method.57 Without delving
into the depth of the different schools of thought, it seems that nowadays the
autonomy of comparative law as a science is established.58 Not only is comparative
law a subject studied in many universities around the world, but some basic texts
are almost uniformly adopted worldwide. 59 At the same time, no one could contest
the existence of the comparative method as a tool for relating different objects and
disciplines. Metaphors and comparisons are essential to comprehend new concepts
and organize thought.60 Therefore, the famous dilemma - whether comparative
law is a discipline or a method - is a false dichotomy, because comparative law is
an autonomous discipline based on the comparative method.61 Discourse on
method is essential because it clarifies the tools of the discipline and its objectives.
More importantly, to keep in mind the co-existence of both discipline and method
helps the scholar apply the comparative method to new subject areas, eventually
contributing to the expansion of comparative law.
The main characteristics of comparative law originate from the fact that it
does not focus on a mere legal system, but on two or more systems of law.62 This
does not necessarily imply that comparative law is a mere theoretical exercise. On
the contrary, comparative law often adopts a functionalist approach and may have
very concrete outcomes. Comparative law explores how a concrete problem is
solved in different jurisdictions and may constitute a useful tool for the
construction or amendment of legal systems. Comparative law has an evolutionary
or dynamic dimension in that it may stimulate change.
There are two main criticisms against comparative law. The first relates to the
scientific rigour of the discipline. Authors highlight that comparative law may be
superficial, as it necessarily investigates two or more legal systems rather than
focusing on one. Furthermore, authors have questioned whether a lawyer trained in
a certain legal system may truly understand another system without pre-judging it
according to the legal categories that constitute her legal imprinting. 63 According
57. W.J. Kamba, Comparative Law a Theoretical Framework, 23 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 485, 486-
87 (1974), quoting Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject, 82 LAW Q. REV. 40 (1966)
(explaining that comparative law "has by common consent the somewhat unusual characteristic that it
does not exist"); see Djalil Kiekbaev, Comparative Law: Method, Science or Educational Discipline?,
7.3 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. (Sept. 2003), http://www.ejcl.org/73/art73-2.html (discussing the different
approaches of comparative law).
58. Comparative law became an autonomous legal discipline at the end of the XIX century.
ALESSANDRO PIZZORUSSO, SISTEMI GIURIDICI COMPARATI 145 (2d ed. 1998); Marc Ancel, Comment
aborder le droit compard (A propos d'une nouvelle "Introduction au droit compard"), in ETUDES
OFFERTES A RENE RODIERE 3 (1981).
59. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 56, at v (noting that the "Introduction to Comparative Law
now has more readers outside Germany than inside it").
60. See ESIN ORVCO, THE ENIGMA OF COMPARATIVE LAW - VARIATIONS ON A THEME FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 11 (2004) (stating that, "Comparison is the essence of understanding").
61. Id. at 1 (explaining that there "is no one single definition of what comparative law and
comparative method are.").
62. Id.
63. Ferdinand Joseph Maria Feldbrugge, Sociological Research Methods and Comparative Law,
in BUTS ET METHODS DU DROIT COMPARE/AIMS AND METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 211, 214
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to this line of thought, being raised in a certain legal tradition or culture determines
certain procedural or substantive choices.64
The second criticism relates to the comparative method. It is claimed that
depending on the perspective adopted, comparisons may have completely different
outcomes. In other words, where one stands on any particular issue is nearly
always dependent upon where one sits. 61 In comparing two elements, scholars may
confuse the two instead of keeping them separate.66 Although the idea of a neutral
referent or tertium comparationis may seem attractive in theory, it may become
misleading in practice. An example may clarify the issue at stake. Let us imagine a
debate on the shade of color alpha which is neither black nor red. Is alpha a red
color with a black glance or is it a black color with a red glance? Some may even
hypothesize that the essence of alpha is violet. Whatever the shade, it is evident
that if alpha is compared to other red colors, it will look black; while if it is
compared to black colors, it will look red. Instead, if alpha is compared to black
and red colors all together, its shade will appear similar to purple. In conclusion,
depending on the particular perspective adopted, the results of the comparative
process may be very different.
These criticisms have the merit of showing certain limits and risks of
comparative law. The interpreter must be aware of the perspective selected to
avoid the risks mentioned above. For instance, with regard to the breadth of the
discipline, one may well focus on certain aspects, leaving other aspects to
subsequent studies. With regard to the constitutive bias of any legal scholar trained
in a certain legal system, this question may have become moot in practice. It is not
rare that scholars are trained in two or more jurisdictions and are therefore exposed
to more than one legal culture. Globalization has globalized legal careers.67 The
fact that scholars often speak one or more foreign languages facilitates access to
(Rotondi ed., 1973); Gilnter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Rethinking Comparative Law, 26
HARV. INT'L L.J. 411, 415 (1985) (referring to the "skeptical assumption that objective comparison is
impossible because the compara[t]ist's vision is totally determined by her specific historical and social
experience and perspective").
64. See Richard Kreindler, Arbitration or Litigation? ADR Issues in Transnational Disputes, 52
DisP. RESOL. J. 79, 79 (1997); Amanda Stallard, Note, Joining the Culture Club: Examining Cultural
Context When Implementing International Dispute Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 463
(2002).
65. Similarly, with regard to the International Court of Justice, the "data suggest[s] that national
bias has an important influence on the decision making of the ICJ. Judges vote for their home states
about 90 percent of the time. When their home states are not involved, judges vote for states that are
similar to their home states--along the dimensions of wealth, culture and political regime." Eric A.
Posner & Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD.
599, 624 (2005).
66. Talking about comparisons, Wittgenstein pointed out the great risk of confusing the prototype
with the object of comparison, which we are viewing in its light. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE
AND VALUE 14 (G.H. Von Wright ed., Peter Winch trans., 1980).
67. As Tom Ginsburg puts it, " [g]lobalization leads to pressure on legal cultures.., national legal
cultures that were more or less autonomous are now subject to a variety of external pressures because of
the growing rate of cross-national interaction." Tom Ginsburg, The Culture ofArbitration, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1335, 1337 (2003).
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primary sources. Furthermore, the willingness to understand and to appreciate the
particular features of a foreign system should not be perceived as a form of naivet6
but as a humble attempt to decipher a certain system and to contribute to the
development of comparative law, and possibly of the examined legal systems
themselves. With regard to the methodological problem of confusing the elementa
comparationis, this problem does not exist in comparative law alone, but it appears
as soon as analogies are drawn.
In conclusion, to argue that the comparative method is useless because it is a
risky enterprise would go too far. The comparative method requires both audacity
and carefulness: the mapping of foreign lands requires certain methodological
choices and the selection of a particular scale and perspective. What seems
important is not the adoption of a particular perspective, but the awareness that the
comparative method may lead to different results, and therefore, the perspective
adopted needs to be spelled out at the outset.68 Much more critical work needs to
be done.
IV. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW
Comparativists and internationalists alike have almost entirely neglected the
interaction between international law and comparative law. As Professor Kennedy
once put it, "[i]nternationalists seem comfortable with power and uncomfortable
with culture, while comparativists are eager for cultural understanding and wary of
involvement with governance., 69 However, this attitude is gradually changing. On
the one hand, comparativists have highlighted that the traditional focus of
comparative law on national systems is old fashioned and they have argued that
comparative law should integrate the most important transnational regimes.70 On
the other hand, internationalists have similarly emphasized that "[t]he
internationalist and comparativist share more than they realize. 71 It is a matter of
time, but it may be foreseen that the interplay between international law and
comparative law will receive increasing attention. This paper aims to contribute to
this emerging area of study by focusing on the linkage between international
investment law, which is a sub-system of international law and comparative law.
This interaction has four different but related dimensions: 1) comparative
investment law; 2) comparative arbitration law; 3) legal doctrine; and 4) treaty
interpretation. The following sub-sections highlight these four paths. While the
first two dimensions are only briefly mentioned, and reference to the relevant
literature is made, the role of comparative law in legal doctrine and treaty
interpretation is analyzed in more detail.
68. See infra Section IV.
69. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 633. Kennedy also remarked, "For the comparativist,
internationalists seem rather vulgar presentists, always wanting lessons and applications and solutions.
For the internationalist, the comparativist seems a snob or a dilettante .... Id. at 556-57.
70. Mathias Reimann, Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law for the International Age,
75 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1119 (2001).
71. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 557.
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A. Comparative Investment Law
The national legal frameworks regulating foreign investment may be studied
through comparative lenses?. This field of enquiry can be called comparative
investment law, and refers to the study and comparison of the different legal
frameworks regulating foreign investment at the national and/or regional levels. A
number of authors have investigated comparative investment law. 73 From an
international law perspective, however, this approach has only limited merit,
because it focuses on national investment codes. While these national codes often
reflect and implement international law norms, they maintain a national character
as national lawmakers have elaborated on them and national courts have
adjudicated them.
B. Comparative Arbitration Law
Comparative lawyers have studied international arbitration as a paradigmatic
melting pot of legal cultures. Professor Ginsburg highlighted that international
arbitration constitutes "a place of convergence and interchange wherein
practitioners from different backgrounds create new practices. 74 Others have
stressed that the emerging arbitration culture fuses together elements of the
common law and civil law tradition.75 From an international law perspective, these
studies provide international law scholars with important theoretical and logical
tools for their profession.
72. Some authors have focused on the adoption by national legislatures of models from foreign
statutes. See Daphne Barak-Erez, An International Community of Legislatures?, in THE LEAST
EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 532, 532 (Richard
W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006); Helen Xanthaki, Legal Transplants in Legislation: Defusing
the Trap, 57 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 659 (2008).
73. Jean-Yves P. Steyt, Comparative Foreign Investment Law: Determinants of the Legal
Framework and the Level of Openness and Attractiveness of Host Economies (May 2006) (LLM
dissertation, Cornell Law School), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps LLMGRP/1/; L.
Yves Fortier, The Canadian Approach to Investment Protection: How Far Have We Come!, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY- ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER 525-43 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009); Michael Mikiciuk, Foreign Direct Investment
Success in Ireland Can Poland Duplicate Ireland's Economic Success Based on Foreign Direct
Investment Policies?, 14 U. MLkM INT'L & COM. L. REV. 65 (2006); Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Finding
and Facing Facts about Legal Systems and FDI in South Asia, 23 LEGAL STUD. 649 (2003); AMANDA J.
PERRY, LEGAL SYSTEMS AS DETERMINANT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: LESSONS FROM SRI
LANKA (2001); Amanda J. Perry, Effective Legal Systems and Foreign Direct Investment: In Search of
the Evidence, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 779 (2000); Antonio R. Parra, Principles Governing Foreign
Investment, as Reflected in National Investment Codes, in IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT
OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE WORLD BANK GUIDELINES 311 (1993); Jflrgen Voss, The Protection
and Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: Interests, Interdependencies,
Intricacies, 31 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 686 (1982).
74. See Ginsburg, supra note 67, at 1335.
75. See Christian Borris, The Reconciliation of Conflicts Between Common Law and Civil Law
Principles in the Arbitration Process, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND NEW TRENDS 1, 1 (Stefan N. Frommel & Barry A.K. Rider eds.,
1999).
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C. Legal Doctrine
In scrutinizing investment law and arbitration, scholars have made use of the
comparative method, albeit in an implicit manner. Since scholars belonging to
different legal cultures produce international legal doctrine, it is inevitable that this
scholarship reflects its multicultural origin and different approaches. Reference to
national and regional case law is a constant feature in articles concerning
international investment law and this does not necessarily reflect a form of
nationalism, as reference is often done to the case law of other countries as well.76
This particular interaction between comparative law and investment law
scholarship is of particular relevance because in international law, the opinion of
legal scholars is deemed to have a certain, albeit subsidiary, legal value. The
Statute of the International Court of Justice (JCJ) expressly enumerates "the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations" as
"subsidiary means for the determination of the sources of law., 77 On the one hand,
as Oppenheim clarified more than a century ago, "the writers on international law.
. have to pronounce whether there is an established custom or not, whether there
is a usage only in contradistinction to a custom, whether a recognized usage has
now ripened into a custom, and the like. 78 On the other hand, international law
scholars "have to ascertain the precise meaning of [the written] rules with the help
of interpretation. 79
With regard to international arbitration, Ginsburg highlighted that "[l]ike the
grand civil law tradition, it is scholarly commentary that produces the law and
technique of arbitration. 80 With regard to investment treaty arbitration, the
influence of scholarly analysis is of utmost importance. On the one hand, scholars
and professors of international law are often selected as arbitrators in investment
treaty disputes. 81 Therefore, it may be expected that their academic experience is
somehow drawn upon in the settlement of the dispute. On the other hand, both
76. For instance, while the Tecmed Tribunal relied on ECtHR cases, none of the members of the
Tribunal were Europeans. See Walid Ben Hamida, Investment Arbitration and Human Rights, 4
TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT. 5, 14 (2007).
77. ICJ Statute, supra note 13, art. 38(1)(d). The ICJ Statute is annexed to the Charter of the
United Nations of which it forms an integral part. U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI.
78. Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 AM. J. INT'L L.
313,315 (1908).
79. Id. at315.
80. See Ginsburg, supra note 67, at 1341-42.
81. For instance, in Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, the late Professor
Walde, acting as an arbitrator, stated that the proper analogy in interpreting investment treaties is not to
international commercial arbitration or public international law, both of which involve disputants who
are seen as equals, but rather to judicial review relating to governmental conduct. Additionally, "[m]ore
appropriate for investor-state arbitration are analogies with judicial review relating to governmental
conduct - be it international judicial review (as carried out by the WTO dispute panels and Appellate
Body, by the European- or Inter-American Human Rights Courts or the European Court of Justice) or
national administrative courts judging disputes of individual citizens' over alleged abuse by public
bodies of their governmental powers." Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, 255
Fed. Appx. 531 (2007) (separate opinion of arbitrator Thomas Walde, at 13, available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Thunderbird/Thunderbird Dissent.pdf).
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advocates and arbitrators make reference to the works of scholars in their pleadings
and awards respectively. 82 Finally, as an arbitrator has emphasized, "[a]wards are
there to be evaluated and criticized -relentlessly criticized - in the interest of
improving international legal systems.
83
Academics have contributed to the development of international investment
law through both macro-comparisons and micro-comparisons.4 With regard to
macro-comparison, authors have compared international investment law and
arbitration to different legal systems. For instance, investment treaty law has been
compared to administrative law85 and other sets of international law.86
With regard to micro-comparison, authors have compared specific investment
treaty standards to rules belonging to other legal orders.87 In certain cases,
82. For instance, in his separate opinion to the Thunderbird case, Professor Walde made reference
to Professor Gaillard's work: "Emmanuel Gaillard, Jurisprudence du CIRDI, 2004, at 7." Id. at 13, n.7.
In the Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN BHD v. the Government of Malaysia, the ad hoc committee
cited the work of Professor Christoph Schreuer (citing CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (2001)) and Yulia Andreeva (citing Yulia Andreeva, Salvaging or
Sinking the Investment? MIS v Malaysia Revisited, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS vol. 7, no. 2, at 161 (2008)). Malaysian Historical Salvors SDNBHD v. Gov't
of Malay., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment, 67, 76 (Feb. 28,
2009), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&docld=DC1030 En&caseld=C247.
83. Jan Paulsson, Awards - and Awards, in INVESTMENT TREATY LAW CURRENT ISSUES III:
REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 97, 98 (Andrea K. Bjorklund et al. eds., 2009).
84. While micro-comparison "has to do with specific legal institutions or problems", macro-
comparison aims to "compare the spirit and style of different legal systems, the methods of thought and
procedures ... for resolving and deciding disputes, or the roles of those engaged in the law." ZWEIGERT
& KOTZ, supra note 56, at 4-5.
85. Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 121 (2006); GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007) (the core argument of the book lies in the accurate analogy
between investment treaty arbitration and administrative courts); Gus Van Harten, A Case for an
International Investment Court, Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Inaugural Conference
2008 Paper (June 30, 2008).
86. August Reinisch & Loretta Malintoppi, Methods of Dispute Resolution, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 691 (PETER MUCHLINSKI et al. eds., 2008);
Christian Tomuschat, The European Court of Human Rights and Investment Protection, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 636 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).
87. The list of possible examples is endless. See NICK GALLUS, THE TEMPORAL SCOPE OF
INVESTMENT PROTECTION TREATIES 20-21 (2008) (comparing the rule against retroactivity used by
investment tribunals to that used by other international tribunals including the International Court of
Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights); John Y.
Gotanda, Assessing Damages in International Commercial Arbitration: A Comparison with Investment
Treaty Disputes, in INVESTMENT TREATY LAW CURRENT ISSUE III: REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 77 (Andrea K.
Bjorklund et al. eds., 2009); Jfirgen Kurtz, National Treatment, Foreign Investment and Regulatory
Autonomy: The Search for Protectionism or Something More?, in NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 311 (Philippe Kahn & Thomas Wdlde eds., 2007) (comparing the doctrinal evolution
on national treatment in investment treaty law with that of GATT Article III (4) under WTO law);
Sylvie Tabet, Application de l'obligation de traitement national et de traitement de la nation la plus
favorisde dans la jurisprudence arbitrale en mati~re d'investissement - Nouveaux problkmes a la
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international legal scholarship has advocated a proactive use of comparative law in
the course of arbitral proceedings. For instance, an author made reference to a
WTO case to critically assess the application of the Most Favored Nation (MFN)
to investor state arbitration.88 In an interesting contribution on the fair and
equitable treatment (FET), another author has advocated an extensive use of the
comparative method, arguing that only by comparing the FET standard with the
national articulations of the Rule of Law, can the meaning of the standard become
concrete:
Instead of primarily relying on prior arbitral decisions, an approach that
is little helpful in particular when disputes concern novel circumstances,
or positing the content of the fair and equitable treatment in an abstract
way without sufficient justification, tribunals should use a comparative
method that draws on domestic and international law regarding the
concept of the rule of law.89
Other authors have similarly advocated an extensive use of national
precedents with regard to the interpretation of the notion of expropriation. For
instance, on the theme of regulatory expropriation and environmental protection,
Walde and Kolo argued that the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court could
represent a valid persuasive precedent for investment treaty tribunals. 90 Since
investment treaty tribunals are analogous to administrative tribunals or
constitutional courts, the case law of the US Supreme Court would serve as useful
guidance for arbitral tribunals.
While these functionalist approaches seem to offer concrete solutions to
emerging conceptual dilemmas, and highly reputed scholars have forcefully
presented such dilemmas, one may question whether a more critical approach to
the use of comparative law should be adopted. While scholarly analysis has made
extensive use of comparative law, and has deemed it a panacea for solving
interpretative dilemmas, methodology issues have been neglected.
lumi~re de la jurisprudence de l'OMC, in NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 352
(Philippe Kahn & Thomas Wfilde eds., 2007). Perhaps the area of international investment law where
the use of analogy has been more expansively adopted is the concept of property. See, e.g., Christoph
Schreuer & Ursula Kriebaum, The Concept of Property in Human Rights Law and International
Investment Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW: LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS
WILDHABER 743 (S. Breitenmoser et al. eds., 2007); Helene Ruiz Fabri, The Approach Taken by the
European Court of Human Rights to the Assessment of Compensation for Regulatory Expropriations of
the Property of Foreign Investors, 11 N.Y.U. ENVT'L L.J. 148 (2002).
88. See Walid Ben Hamida, MFN Clause and Procedural Rights: Seeking Solutions from WTO
Experience?, 6 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT 1 (2009). See also Jfirgen Kurtz, The Use and Abuse of WTO
Law in Investor - State Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents' (2009) 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 749,
749-71 (2009); Nicholas Di Mascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Non Discrimination in Trade and Investment
Treaties: Two Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 48 (2008).
89. Stephan W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an
Embodiment of the Rule of Law 29 (New York University Law School, International Law & Justice
Working Paper No. 6, 2006), available at http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2006-6-GAL-
Schill-web.pdf (last visited June 16, 2010).
90. Thomas Wdlde & Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and
'Regulatory Taking' in International Law, 50 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 811, 821 (2001).
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It is often assumed that comparative law is a neutral process, but this is not
always the case. The very selection of the elementa comparationis may affect the
outcome of a case. For instance, the Lauder case91 and the CME case 92- which
were parallel proceedings over the same underlying dispute - had different
outcomes because different BITs governed the substantive law and the arbitral
tribunals gave different weight to the comparative method. While the Lauder
Tribunal referred to a human rights case for establishing the expropriation
standards,93 the other Tribunal did not. As an author put it, "one is left to wonder,
therefore, whether this would explain how the two tribunals came to ... opposite
decisions. 94
Another example may clarify the issues at stake. The ICSID Convention and
other arbitral rules leave arbitral tribunals a wide discretion with regard to costs.
95
In the Thunderbird case, in deciding how to allocate the costs for legal
representation, Professor Walde argued that "[t]he judicial practice most
comparable to treaty-based investor-state arbitration is the judicial recourse
available to individuals against states under the European Convention on Human
Rights; again, states have to defray their own legal representation expenditures,
even if they prevail. 9 6 By contrast, in the Europe Cement case, the Arbitral
Tribunal awarded the respondent full costs to "compensat[e] the Respondent for
having to defend a claim that had no jurisdictional basis and discourage others
from pursuing such unmeritorious claims. 97 Authors have pointed out that
"[r]ecently, some tribunals [in investment arbitration] have adopted . . . the
principle that the successful party should have its costs paid by the unsuccessful
party, as adopted in commercial arbitration."98 This example clearly shows that
91. Lauder v. Czech Rep., Final Award (Sept. 3, 2001), 9 ICSID Rep. 66 (2001), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LauderAward.pdf.
92. CME Czech Rep. B.V. v. Czech Rep., Partial Award, (Sept. 13, 2001), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-200lPartialAward.pdf; CME Czech Rep. B.V. v. Czech Rep.,
Final Award (Mar. 14, 2003), 9 ICSID Rep. 121 (2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/CME-2003-Final_001 .pdf.
93. Lauder v. Czech Rep., supra note 91, at 200 (quoting Mellacher v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1989)).
94. James D. Fry, International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: Evidence of
International Law's Unity, 18 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 77, 84 (2007).
95. ICSID Convention, supra note 15, art. 61(2).
96. Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, 255 Fed. Appx. 531, 141 (2007)
(separate opinion of arbitrator Thomas Walde, at 13, available at http://www.naftaclaims.
com/Disputes/Mexico/Thunderbird/Thunderbird Dissent.pdf) (emphasis added).
97. Europe Cement Investment & Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/2, Award, 185 (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://arbitration.fr/resources/ICSID-ARB-
AF-07-2.pdf. It is worth noting that the sentence is borrowed from an eminent scholar, Professor
Schreuer, who similarly wrote that such an award "serves the purposes of compensating the victorious
party and of dissuading unmeritorious claims". Id. at 182. Professor Schreuer's position on the matter
reflects the practice adopted in commercial arbitration, and in several national systems. See, for
instance, Article 91 of the Italian code of civil procedure.
98. ADC Affiliate Ltd. and ADC & ADMC Mgmt. Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/16, Award, 532 (Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC648_En&caseld=C231 (quoting
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depending on which material is selected for comparison, the outcome may be
different.
D. Treaty Interpretation
A fourth area of intersection between investment law and comparative law is
seen in the increasing cross-fertilization between different international tribunals.
This trend may be called "global comparative jurisprudence," and reflects the fact
that international tribunals look to the decisions of other international bodies on
related or analogous matters. The reliance of both phenomena on the use of
analogy ties judicial borrowing to comparative law. Analogy is a cognitive process
which transfers an argument from one particular to another particular. Analogy
plays a significant role in comparisons, which are the core element of judicial
borrowing. Unlike commercial arbitrators who apply different laws depending on
the subject matter of the disputes, investment treaty arbitrators apply a limited
number of concepts under public international law. The focus of arbitral tribunals
is on both the concepts they are applying and on the decisions of other tribunals.
Indeed, while arbitral tribunals have limited jurisdiction, their authority to
engage in judicial borrowing derives from the fluid nature of international law. In
international law, Article 38(d) of the ICJ Statute considers judicial decisions as
"subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." 99 In parallel, systemic
interpretation is a customary tool of treaty interpretation. 100 In addition, the
consistent interpretation and application of certain treaty norms may consolidate in
the opinio juris necessary to transform a certain treaty provision into customary
international law. Finally, certain investment treaty provisions, such as Fair and
Equitable Treatment, present an obvious analogy with equity as a general principle
of law under the regime set out in Article 38(c) of the ICJ Statute.
Investment arbitral tribunals have made extensive use of systematic
interpretation, referring to the jurisprudence of previous arbitral tribunals, national
administrative and constitutional courts on the one hand, and to the case law of
regional human rights courts and international courts and tribunals on the other. As
arbitrators have made use of comparative arguments albeit implicitly, it seems
crucial to map the current dimension of the phenomenon and to propose a more
conscious use of the comparative method. The unaware use of the comparative
method may determine the abuse of the same, and ultimately lead to undesirable
outcomes. Arbitrators risk acting as "bricoleurs" rather than as "engineers" of legal
norms:101 "As engineers, they would sort through the concepts and assemble them
into a constitutional design that made sense according to some overarching
conceptual scheme. As bricoleurs, though, they.., use the first thing that happens
Matthew Weiniger & Matthew Page, Treaty Arbitration and Investment Dispute: Adding Up the Costs,
1 GLOBAL ARB. REv. 3, 44 (2006)).
99. ICJ Statute, supra note 13, art. 38(1)(d).
100. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT].
101. The metaphor is borrowed from Ldvi-Strauss. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative
Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1285-86 (1999).
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to fit the immediate problem they are facing." 10 2 Since the use of the comparative
method in international investment arbitration may have a great impact on the
development of international investment law and international law in general, a
more conscious use of the comparative method needs to be promoted.
V. THE USE OF THE COMPARATIVE METHOD IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
While authors have extensively focused on the impact of comparative law on
the procedural aspects of international adjudication, 103 scarce attention has been
paid to the impact comparative law may have on the substantive aspects of the
same. While notable contributions scrutinized the phenomenon of judicial
borrowing in areas such as human rights adjudication, 10 4 the use of comparative
law per se in investment treaty arbitration has never been the object of a specific
study. Therefore, this is the first attempt to chart the substantive world of
investment treaty arbitration through the lenses of comparative law. 105 The
following analysis aims at clarifying an ongoing process and its main
characteristics. For limits of space, this analysis cannot be exhaustive; further
study will be required to complete the mapping of this complex landscape.
In a preliminary way, interpretation is a fundamental part of the implementing
process of a treaty. Whatever the conception of the adjudicative function that
arbitrators adopt, it is generally accepted that adjudicators are neither mere bouche
de la loi, nor authentic law makers.106 In a sense, arbitrators have a maieutic role,
102. Id. at 1286.
103. See CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (2007).
Regarding international arbitration, see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral
Procedure, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313 (2003); Borris, supra note 75; Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
International Arbitration as Omelette: What Goes into the Mix, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND NEW TRENDS 19 (Stefan N. Frommel & Barry A.K.
Rider eds., 1999); Serge Lazareff, International Arbitration: Towards a Common Procedural
Approach, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND NEW
TRENDS 31 (Stefan N. Frommel & Barry A.K. Rider eds., 1999).
104. See Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form Versus
Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 391 (2007); Christopher McCrudden,
Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK 371 (Esin Orici &
David Nelsen eds., 2007); David Schneiderman, Property Rights and Regulatory Innovation:
Comparing Constitutional Cultures, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 371 (2006); Darren Rosemblum, Internalizing
Gender: Why International Law Theory Should Adopt Comparative Methods, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 759 (2007); Sujit Choudhry, Globalization is Search of Justification: Towards a Theory
of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999).
105. In previous contributions, I have analyzed the merit of judicial borrowing with regard to
investment treaty disputes involving cultural elements and intellectual property rights respectively. See
Valentina Vadi, Fragmentation or Cohesion? Investment versus Cultural Protection Rules, 10 J.
WORLD INV. & TRADE 573 (2009); Valentina Vadi, Cultural Heritage & International Investment Law:
A Stormy Relationship, 15 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 1 (2008); Valentina Vadi, Mapping Uncharted
Waters: Intellectual Property Disputes with Public Health Elements in Investor-State Arbitration, 6
TRANSNAT'L DiSP. MGMT. 2 (2009); Valentina Vadi, Trademark Protection, Public Health and
International Investment Law: Strains and Paradoxes, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 773 (2009).
106. For more on the different conceptions of the adjudicative function, see Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Introduction and Summary: 'Administration of Justice' in International Investment Law
and Adjudication?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 3,9-11
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as they give birth to the meaning of treaty provisions, having to identify the
applicable rules, clarify their meaning and relate them to the specific facts of the
case. According to the International Law Commission, "the interpretation of
documents is to some extent an art, not an exact science." °10 7 However, to say that
adjudicators' roles are creative would probably be going too far, because it would
undermine their legitimacy.
Customary rules of treaty interpretation, as restated in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 108 provide the adjudicators with the necessary
conceptual and legal framework to perform their function to settle disputes "in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law." 10 9 Customary rules
of treaty interpretation are applicable to investment treaties because investment
treaties are international law treaties. Furthermore, some investment treaties
expressly mention these rules.110 According to the general rule of interpretation,
which comprises several sub-norms, "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose." '1
Although the VCLT does not make reference to cases, these may be
considered as "supplementary means of interpretation."' 12 As mentioned above, the
ICJ Statute includes cases among the "subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law." '113 In most cases, as Professor Schreuer highlights, conversations
across cases take place, 114 and a systemic study of the case law of international
tribunals suggests the "tendency to chart a coherent course within international
law." '115 Looking at the arbitral awards, there is not only a sort of endogenous path
coherence by which arbitrators look at previous arbitral awards, but also an
increasingly heterogeneous path coherence by which arbitrators look at the
jurisprudence of other international courts. 116
The use of the comparative method in investment treaty arbitration is a
frequent phenomenon because investment treaties generally tend to converge and
often present similar if not identical wording. Furthermore, international
(P.M. Dupuy et al. eds., 2009).
107. Int'l L. Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties: Text as Finally Adopted by the
Commission on 18 July 1966, 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 218, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/190.
108. VCLT, supra note 100.
109. Id. at Preamble.
110. See, e.g., Australia United States Free Trade Agreement art. 21.9(2), U.S.-Austl., May 18,
2004, 118 Star. 919, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us fta/final-text/index.html.
111. VCLT, supra note 100, art. 31(1).
112. Supplementary methods of interpretation include, but are not limited to, the circumstances of
the conclusion of a treaty and preparatory work. VCLT, supra note 100, art. 32.
113. ICJ Statute, supra note 13, art. 38(1)(b).
114. Christoph Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger, Conversations Across Cases - Is There a Doctrine
of Precedent in Investment Arbitration?, 5 TRANSNAT'L DisP. MGMT. 3 (2008).
115. Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the
Vienna Convention, 54 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 279,289 (2005).
116. Valentina Vadi, Towards Arbitral Path Coherence & Judicial Borrowing: Persuasive
Precedent in Investment Arbitration, 5 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 1, 1-16 (2008).
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investment law often presents analogies and overlaps with other international law
sub-systems, regional law and even national law. Consequently, one may identify
three main streams of comparative reasoning. First, arbitrators often refer to
previous arbitral awards. Second, arbitrators refer to other international or regional
cases. Third, they refer to national cases. The following sub-sections will scrutinize
these three streams.
A. Reference to Previous Arbifral Awards
Investment arbitration tribunals are increasingly making reference to previous
arbitral awards. This creates a sort of endogenous coherence (i.e., a coherence
which is internal to international investment law). The fact that most countries,
especially the industrialized ones, have predisposed Model BITs to streamline and
simplify the negotiating process facilitates the process. On the one hand, these
treaties often reaffirm rules of customary law. On the other hand, similar treaty
provisions are gradually coalescing and becoming part of customary law. 1 17 This
phenomenon has a major, notable consequence: when interpreting and applying
investment treaty provisions, arbitral tribunals, albeit selected on a ad hoc basis,
are substantively applying the "common law" of investment protection, a law
which is common to the international community as a whole.
While the rule of stare decisis, or binding precedent, does not apply to
international arbitration and more generally to international disputes, 1 8 arbitrators
refer to previous awards. In the recent case Europe Cement Investment & Trade
S.A v. Republic of Turkey, 119 the Arbitral Tribunal considered the possibility of
issuing moral damages, making reference to the Desert Line case. 120 In the
Feldman Karpa case, the Tribunal reaffirmed that a tribunal award has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of a particular case. However, "in
view of the fact that both of the parties in this proceeding have extensively cited
and relied upon some of the earlier decisions, the Tribunal believe[d] it appropriate
,,12 1 e aeto discuss briefly relevant aspects of earlier decisions .... In the Saipem case,
117. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 128-30 (2003).
118. For instance, previous panel and Appellate Body decisions in WTO dispute settlement
constitute non-binding precedent. See Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade
Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 845, 849-52 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Precedent
Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 1, 1 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De lure Stare Decisis in WTO
Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 873, 876 (2001). However, the
Appellate Body in US-Stainless Steel, required panels to advance "cogent reasons" to justify departure
from its previous decisions, thus gradually expanding the quasi-binding force of its decisions. See
Appellate Body Report, United States - Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico,
160, WT/DS344/AB/R (April 30, 2008), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/us-
stainlessmexico(ab).pdf
119. Europe Cement Investment & Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/2, Award (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://arbitration.fr/resources/ICSID-ARB-AF-07-
2.pdf.
120. Id. at 178 (citing Desert Line Project LLC v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/07, Award (Feb. 6, 2008), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/DesertLine.pdf).
121. Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/9901, Award on Merits (Dec.
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after stating that previous decisions were not binding, the Tribunal held that it had
to pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals:
[The Tribunal] believes that, subject to compelling contrary
grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of
consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to the specifics of a
given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, it has a
duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of
investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations
of the community of States and investors towards certainty of the
rule of law.
122
B. Reference to the Case Law of Other International Courts and Tribunals
Arbitrators do refer to the decisions of other international or regional courts
and tribunals. This form of judicial borrowing creates heterogeneous path
coherence, a dynamic process which may lead to a sort of judicial globalization,1 23
or the development of a "common law of international adjudication., 124 Professor
Slaughter, who first identified the twin issues of global community of courts and
global jurisprudence, 125 highlights the development of judicial comity, a set of
principles guiding courts in giving deference to foreign courts
"as a matter of respect owed by judges to judges, rather than of the more general
respect owed by one nation to another., 126 Judicial transplant is particularly useful
to cope with systemic lacunae of a given legal system. As a comparative lawyer
once put it, "transplanting is, in fact, the most fertile source of development" as the
"insertion of an alien rul[ing] into another.., system may cause it to operate in a
fresh way.
' 127
With regard to investment arbitration, judicial borrowing has been particularly
useful in interpreting and clarifying human rights concepts. As Justice Claire
L'Hereux-Dubd of the Canadian Supreme Court once said: "More and more courts
... are looking to the judgments of other jurisdictions, particularly when making
decisions on human rights issues. Deciding on applicable legal principles and
solutions increasingly involves a consideration of the approaches that have been
adopted with regard to similar legal problems elsewhere." 128 Cross-fertilization and
judicial dialogue have created an important body of global jurisprudence. 129 As
16, 2002), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/feldman mexico-award-english.pdf.
122. Saipem S.p.A. v. People's Republic of Bangl., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award, 90 (June
30, 2009), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SaipemBangladeshAwardJune3009 002.pdf.
123. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1103 (2000).
124. See BROWN, supra note 103, at 4-5.
125. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 193 (2003).
126. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 67 (2004). For more on judicial comity,
see also W. T. Worster, Competition and Comity in the Fragmentation of International Law, 34 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 119 (2008-09).
127. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 95, 116 (2d ed.
2003).
128. Claire L'Heureux-Dubd, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International
Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 16 (1998).
129. When judges do cite foreign decisions as persuasive authority and they follow similar
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Slaughter highlights: "Increasing cross-fertilization of ideas and precedents among
constitutional judges around the world is gradually giving rise to increasingly
visible international consensus on various issues - a consensus that, in turn, carries
its own compelling weight." 130 The universal recognition of human rights requires
judges to take human rights into consideration in the settlement of disputes "in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law," as prescribed in
the preamble of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
131
Investment treaty tribunals have often referred to the decisions of other
international courts for guidance. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has been a useful
source of reference for arbitral tribunals.1 2 The Tribunal, which was established to
resolve the political crisis between Iran and the United States in 1979, has decided
inter alia claims which arose out of expropriations or other measures affecting
property rights. Because of the comparability of the subject matter, arbitral
tribunals have referred to its case law with regard to some key issues such as
regulatory expropriation. For instance, in Saipem v. Bangladesh, the Arbitral
Tribunal made reference to a case of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to hold that a
state can expropriate immaterial rights.133 In his Separate Opinion in the
Thunderbird case, professor Walde made reference to the Iran-US Tribunal' s
practice with regard to the award of attorney costs.
114
ICSID Tribunals have extensively referred to decisions of the ICJ 135 and its
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice. 136 Indeed, public
reasoning, cross-fertilization evolves in something deeper resembling an emerging global jurisprudence.
See McCrudden, supra note 104, at 393-94.
130. Slaughter, supra note 126, at 78.
131. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Judging Judges: Do Judges Meet Their Constitutional Obligation to
Settle Disputes in Conformity with 'Principles of Justice and International Law'?, 1 EuR. J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (2007).
132. The political crisis between Iran and the United States arose when 52 United States nationals
were detained at the United States Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and the United States
subsequently froze Iranian assets. The Tribunal was established out of the Algiers Accords of January
19, 1981. The literature on the Iran U.S. Tribunal is extensive. See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL &
CHRISTOPHER S. GIBSON, THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AT 25: THE CASES EVERYONE NEEDS TO
KNOW FOR INVESTOR-STATE & INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2009).
133. Saipem S.p.A. v. People's Republic of Bangl., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, 130 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Saipem-Bangladesh-Jurisdiction.pdf (citing Phillips Petroleum
Company Iran v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 79 (1989)).
134. Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, 255 Fed. Appx. 531 (2007)
(separate opinion of arbitrator Thomas Walde, at 140, available at http://www.naftaclaims.
con/Disputes/Mexico/Thunderbird/Thunderbird Dissent.pdf) (quoting Sylvania v Iran, 8 Iran-US CTR
298, 324 (1985)).
135. For instance, in Maffezini v. Spain, the Tribunal referred to the ICJ decision Rights of
Nationals of America in Morocco (France v. United States) when deciding on the scope of protection of
the MFN clause. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award on Jurisdiction, 43-50 (Jan.
25, 2000), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Maffezini-Jurisdiction-English 001.pdf.
136. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Award, 11 (July 25,
2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LGEEnglish 006.pdf. The Permanent Court of
International Justice was established by the Covenant of the League of Nations. It held its inaugural
sitting in 1922 and was dissolved in 1946. The work of the PCIJ, the first permanent international
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international law can be considered the legal framework or system of which
international investment law is a sub-system. Before the inception of investment
treaty arbitration, investment treaties provided for an interstate process only;
governments therefore had to "sponsor" private claims. Nowadays, recourse to
diplomatic protection has become "residual," 137 and primarily international
investment treaties, rather than customary international law alone, now protect
foreign investors. Against this background, arbitral tribunals still take into account
the case law of the ICJ and PCIJ to clarify the meaning of legal concepts. A
notable example relates the nationality issue.138 In Soufraki v. United Arab
Emirates, the Arbitral Tribunal referred to the Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v.
Guatemala) when discussing the question of the nationality of the claimant.13 9
However, other arbitral tribunals refer to the dicta of international tribunals as
a starting point for further enquiry. For instance, in the Europe Cement case,140
when the respondent alleged that the claimant had abused the process and
requested declaratory relief (i.e., a declaration that there had been such abuse), the
Arbitral Tribunal stated: "Declaratory relief is a common form of relief in
international tribunals in state-to-state cases, but no cases were cited to us of
tribunals established under the ICSID Convention. . . or under international
investment treaties more generally where declarations were granted as a form of
relief., 141 In conclusion, the Tribunal acknowledged that declaratory relief had
been used in the Corfu Channel Case and the Rainbow Warrior Case,142 but it also
questioned whether previous arbitral tribunals had adopted such declaration. In
tribunal with general jurisdiction, made possible the clarification of a number of aspects of international
law, and contributed to its development. See Antonio S. de Bustamante Y Sirven, The Permanent Court
of International Justice 9 MINN. L. REv. 240 (1924-1925); OLE SPIERMANN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENTS IN THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: THE RISE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY (2005).
137. While in the seventies, the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case found it "surprising" that the
evolution of international investment law had not gone further in the light of the expansion of economic
activities in the preceding half century, in the more recent Diallo case, the Court has recognized the
residual nature of the exercise of diplomatic protection and recourse to the Court in case of investment
disputes. These different obiter dicta reflect the recent flourishing of investment treaties and investment
treaty arbitration. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3,
at 89 (Feb 5); Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), (Preliminary
Objections), at 88-91 (Judgment of May 24, 2007), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/103/13856.pdf.
138. The nationality issue concerns the determination of the nationality of the claimant. See ICSID
Convention, supra note 15, art. 25.
139. Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. U.A.E., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, Decision on Jurisdiction,
45 (July 7, 2004), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Soufraki 000.pdf.
140. Europe Cement Investment & Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/2, Award (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://arbitration.fr/resources/ICSID-ARB-AF-07-
2.pdf.
141. Id. at 148.
142. Id. at 148, n.32 (explaining that the "Respondent cited to the Tribunal both the Corfu
Channel Case (UK v.
Albania) (Merits), [1949] ICJ Reports 4, RLA-15 and the Rainbow Warrior Case (New Zealand v.
France),
Award, 30 Apr. 1990, 20 RIAA 215, RLA-42.").
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other words, notwithstanding the persuasiveness of the ICJ decisions, the Arbitral
Tribunal was enquiring into further developments of the investment treaty
arbitration case law.
Arbitral tribunals have cursorily relied on WTO case law for interpreting
investment treaty and NAFTA Chapter 11 provisions. For instance, in ADF v.
United States of America,143 the Arbitral Tribunal referred to the Shrimp Turtle
case and Hormones AB reports when applying customary rules of treaty
interpretation. 144 In his Separate Opinion in the Thunderbird case, 145 Thomas
Walde made the argument that "gambling services, in particular if not typically
accompanied by criminal by-products, have to be treated as a fully legitimate
investment," relying inter alia on WTO panel and Appellate Body cases.
146
The case for drawing from these different bodies of law is evident. On the one
hand, authors have noted that "international courts essentially do share the same
functions" by settling international disputes in accordance with law, and ensuring
the proper administration of justice. 147 On the other hand, certain international
treaties present an articulated regime that the investment treaties presuppose. 148 For
instance, with regard to intellectual property, investment treaties restate or enhance
the intellectual property guarantees provided in the WTO Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS Agreement). 149 When arbitrators
have to interpret TRIPs-plus standards, they must first refer to the TRIPs standards.
Other authors support such an approach, as it would impede the dilution of
multilateral norms while providing predictability.150 As Hsu points out, such
borrowing offers direction in substantive interpretation of treaty language as
143. ADF Group Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB/AF/00/1, Award, (Jan. 9, 2003), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ADF-award 000.pdf.
144. Id. at 147 (citing Appellate Body report, United States- Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); Appellate Body Report, EC-
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 165, 181, WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
145. Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, 255 Fed. Appx. 531 (2007)
(separate opinion of arbitrator Thomas Walde, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/
Disputes/Mexico/Thunderbird/Thunderbird Dissent.pdf).
146. Id. at 18 (citing to "the WTO Appeals Body decision in Antigua/Barbuda v US case of 7
Apr. 2005 ;
WT/DS285/AB/R [which] follow[s] on the earlier panel decision.").
147. Chester Brown, The Use of Precedents of Other International Courts and Tribunals in
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 5(3) TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 1, 2 (2008).
148. Christina Pfaff, Alternative Approaches to Foreign Investment Protection, 3(5) TRANSNAT'L
DIsP. MGMT. 1, 15 (2006).
149. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments- Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1994. For commentary, see the following texts:
DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2003);
CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A
COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2007).
150. Locknie Hsu, Applicability of WTO Law in Regional Trade Agreements: Identifying the Links,
in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 449 (Lorand Bartels & Federico
Ortino eds., 2006).
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arbitral panels would be "able to draw upon the expertise of WTO dispute panels
and the Appellate Body in the development of legal concepts and principles" albeit
maintaining the possibility to contract away such jurisprudence by setting their
own interpretation.
151
In parallel, arbitral tribunals have made reference to and relied on human
rights jurisprudence, to varying degrees, to determine the content of investment
law. 152 For instance, in Lauder v. Czech Republic, the UNCITRAL Tribunal made
reference to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case Mellacher v.
Austria to derive the distinction between a formal and a defacto expropriation. 153
The Teemed Tribunal made reference to an Inter-American Court of Human Rights
case, Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, to determine the content of indirect
expropriation. 11 4 In Saipem S.p.A v. Bangladesh, the Tribunal cited several cases
from the ECtHR for affirming that arbitral awards confer on parties a right to the
sums awarded. 15 5 In the Biloune case, 156 the investor argued that the government of
Ghana had breached both the investment treaty and human rights obligations, and
in the Euro-Tunnel case the claimant argued that the obligations of the United
Kingdom and France should be read in conjunction with the European Convention
on Human Rights and its First Protocol. 15 7 Also amicus curiae may recall non-
investment provisions in their briefs.158 Finally, human rights obligations have also
151. Id. at 551-52.
152. Fry, supra note 94, at 83.
153. Lauder v. Czech Rep., Final Award, T 200 (Sept. 3, 2001), 9 ICSID Rep. 66 (2001) (quoting
Mellacher v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989)), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/LauderAward.pdf.
154. Tdcnicas Medioambientales S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/00/2,
Award, T 116, n.36 (May 29, 2003) 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004) (quoting Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru,
2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74, at 120-24 (Feb. 6, 2001)), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Tecnicas_001.pdf [hereinafter Tecmed].
155. Saipem S.p.A. v. People's Republic of Bangl., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, T 130 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Saipem-Bangladesh-Jurisdiction.pdf (citing Stran Greek Refineries and
Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, App. No. 13427/87, Eur. Ct. H.R, 1 59-62 (1994), available at
http://worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1994/48.html and Brumarescu v. Rom., App. No. 28342/95, Eur. Ct.
H.R., 10 Hum. Rts. Case Dig. 237-41 (1999), available at http://worldlii.org/eu/cases/
ECHRI1999/105.html.
156. Biloune & Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Invs. Ctr. & Gov't of Ghana, Award on
Jurisdiction and Liability, UNCITRAL, (Oct. 27, 1989), 95 ILR 183..
157. Moshe Hirsch, Conflicting Obligations in International Investment Law: Investment
Tribunals' Perspective, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY-ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR
RUTH LAPIDOTH 323, 324-25 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008). In particular, in the Euro-
Tunnel Case, the two claimants complained, inter alia, about the repeated delays and costs related to the
intrusions in their French terminal of illegal immigrants intending to enter in the United Kingdom.
Further they complained that the use of the Tunnel by illegal immigrants has led the United Kingdom to
impose civil penalties on the concessionaries. Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. & France Manche S.A. v.
Gov'ts of U.K. & Fr., Partial Award on Jurisdiction, TT 107, 110 (Jan. 30, 2007), available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/ET PAen.pdf.
158. Hirsch, supra note 157, at 325; see, e.g., Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., NAFTA, Non-Party
Supplemental Submission: Submission of the Quechan Indian Nation (Oct. 16, 2006), available at
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been invoked in the determination of remedies phase. 159 Other cases have made
indirect reference to human rights cases. For instance, Azurix Corp. v. Argentine
Republic indirectly cited human rights jurisprudence by relying on the relevant
portions of the Tecmed decision. 160 Similarly, the EnCana Tribunal cited a
domestic arbitration case that quoted a human rights case. 161 While some
commentators have highlighted the "reluctance of tribunals to openly and
systematically consider the public interest,"'162 others have stressed that arbitral
tribunals increasingly rely on human rights cases "in their decisions, not merely in
their obiter dicta."
16 3
However, arbitral tribunals have generally adopted a cautious approach to the
issue. 164 While the TECMED Tribunal relied on the proportionality test which has
been formulated by the ECtHR, 165 the Arbitral Tribunal in Biloune held that its
jurisdiction was limited to disputes in respect of the foreign investment and that it
lacked "jurisdiction to address, as an independent cause of action, a claim of
violation of human rights."' 166 Arbitral tribunals are forums of limited jurisdiction,
empowered to hear claims on treaty violations. Similarly, the Siemens Tribunal
rejected the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine in investment
arbitration, holding that "Article I of the First Protocol to the European Convention
on Human Rights permits a margin of appreciation not found in customary
international law or the Treaty." 167 In the Euro-tunnel case, the Tribunal defined its
jurisdiction as arising only from the Canterbury Treaty and the related
concessionary contract. 16 Therefore, the Tribunal deemed that its jurisdiction was
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/75016.pdf.
159. See, e.g., Compafhia del Desarollo de Santa Elena v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No.
ARB/96/1, Final Award, 1 64-68 (Feb. 17, 2000), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
santaelena award.pdf.
160. Azurix Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 11 311-12 (June 23,
2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AzurixAwardJuly2006.pdf.
161. EnCana v. Ecuador, London Ct. Int'l Arb., Award, 176, n.124 (Feb. 3, 2006), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/EncanaAwardEnglish.pdf.
162. Charles H. Brower II, Obstacles and Pathways to Consideration of the Public Interest in
Investment Treaty Disputes, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 347, 347
(2008-09).
163. Fry, supra note 94, at 81, n.15 (noting that "[alrbitral tribunals are not throwing in references
to human rights cases merely for the sake of appearances.").
164. Hirsch, supra note 157 at 324, 331.
165. Thcnicas Medioambientales S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/00/2,
Award, 122 (May 29, 2003) 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents
/Tecnicas_001.pdf. The arbitral tribunal made extensive reference to the dicta of other international
courts and tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Id. at 11 116,
120.
166. For commentary see Hirsch, supra note 157, at 329. Biloune & Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v.
Ghana Invs. Ctr. & Gov't of Ghana, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, UNCITRAL, (Oct. 27, 1989),
95 ILR 183, 203; Biloune Case Summary, supra note 156.
167. Siemens A.G. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID No. ARB/02/08, Award, 1 354 (Feb. 6, 2007),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Siemens-Argentina-Award.pdf.
168. Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. & France Manche S.A. v. Gov'ts of U.K. & Fr., Partial Award on
Jurisdiction, 11 124, 135, 152 (Jan. 30, 2007), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload
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limited only to claims concerning the alleged violation of the concession contract
and/or the Treaty. Accordingly, any violation of other international rules of the
European Convention on Human Rights or EC law was beyond jurisdiction.
However, the Arbitral Tribunal did not exclude the possibility that violations of the
Treaty and the contract could be examined in light of rules of general public
international law. As some authors have pointed out, "[i]n other words, even if the
direct violation of such rules was beyond its jurisdiction, the evaluation of a
violation of the concession contract in comparison with these provisions was not
excluded."
' 169
International judicial borrowing, that is, borrowing decisions from other
international fora in the interpretation of international law, would be compatible
with the unity of public international law and would promote its coherence.
Judicial dialogue is feasible and possible: informal linkages already exist. Some
arbitrators have been professors of public international law or judges in other
international fora. 170 More substantially, other subsystems of public international
law may provide interpretative guidance to arbitral tribunals.
However, on a cautionary note, it is important to highlight that distinctions
exist between the different legal sub-systems. Textual differences need to be taken
into account, as interpretation cannot be used to transpose obligations from one
field to another, or to create new obligations. For instance, in Victor Pey Casado v.
Chile, the Arbitral Tribunal made reference to the ICJ LaGrand judgment, which
found that the provisional measures under Article 41 of the ICJ statute were
binding. 171 However, Article 47 of the ICSID Convention contains different
wording, as it states that arbitral tribunals shall have the power to "recommend"
and not to "indicate" provisional measures. 172 While one may agree that such an
/files/ET PAen.pdf (referencing the jurisprudence of the ICJ, the Permanent Court of International
Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Award, at 135, 124, and 152
respectively).
169. Mathias Audit, The Channel Tunnel Group Ltd and France-Manche SA v. United Kingdom
andFrance, 57 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 724, 728 (2008) (emphasis added).
170. For instance, arbitrators may have served as former Presidents or judges of the ICJ (Bedjaoui,
Guillaume, Higgins, Schwebel), former members of the WTO AB (Feliciano, Bacchus), former Judges
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Nikken, Cangado Trindade), former President of the UN
Security Council (Fortier); or may be academics (Berman, Bernini, Bdckstiegel, Brower, Crawford,
Dupuy, Giardina, Kauffmann-Kohler, Higgins, Lowe, Stem, Weiler). See, e.g., International Council
for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA), ICCA Officers & Members, http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/officers-and-members.html#/officers-and-members/MEMBERS.html (last visited Sept. 9,
2010); Law.com, Arbitration Scorecard 2007: Top 50 Treaty Disputes, The American Lawyer, June 13,
2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1181639136817 (listing the top 50 2007 arbitration
disputes with many of the aforementioned judges and scholars named as the arbitrators).
171. Victor Pey Casado & President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No.
ARB/98/2, Decision on Provisional Measures, 17 (Sept. 25, 2001), 16 ICSID Rep. 603 (2001),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Victor-French.pdf (French version, only available in
Spanish or French).
172. See Brown, supra note 147, at 4 (criticizing this approach as inappropriate use of precedent,
subsequently followed by the arbitral tribunal in Tokio Tokeles v. Ukraine (Tokio Tokeles v. Ukr.,
ICSID ARB/02/18, Procedural Order No. 1, 4 (Jul. 1, 2003), 20 ICSID Rep. 205 (2005), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/tokios-orderl .pdf)).
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interpretation favors the effectiveness of the ICSID Convention, and can be
justified by the inherent powers of international courts to grant provisional
measures, without a doubt such line of reasoning involves the expansion of the
treaty terms beyond the purpose of the treaty makers, 173 clearly contributing to the
development and evolution of law, but determining margins of uncertainty. In
other cases, arbitral tribunals have followed the literal treaty terms vis-A-vis other
jurisdictional trends. For instance, in the Methanex case, when the claimant sought
to show that it was a producer "in like circumstances" as US domestic producers
by arguing that Methanex produced "like products" and relying on related WTO
jurisprudence, the Tribunal declined to rely on such jurisprudence, because
NAFTA Chapter 11 did not contain the term of art "like product" which is relevant
in the interpretation of GATT Article 111.174 In addition, investment law does not
incorporate a necessity standard in its disciplines, and in cases of breach its
remedies include compensation, not cessation.
The problem with judicial borrowing is that it is a very powerful instrument
which needs to be handled properly. The major risk consists of adopting an
ideology of free decision making 175 and creating anarchy. In the case selection
there may be a certain bias, as relying on human rights case law rather than WTO
jurisprudence makes a difference in the context of a specific case. 176 Some have
pointed out that "the dissimilar architecture of treaties, including objectives,
obligations, defenses, and remedies, advises against attempts of outright
transposition of rules, methodologies, or solutions....
C. Reference to the Jurisprudence of National Courts
As consideration of other legal regimes is conceptually possible in investment
treaty arbitration, some arbitral tribunals expressly refer to national cases. 178 Is
national case law applicable to foreign investment-related disputes? To answer this
question, a distinction needs to be made. If the applicable law is that of the host
173. CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 758 (2001) (Professor
Schreuer underlined that the "Convention's legislative history shows clearly that a conscious decision
was made not to grant the Tribunal the power to order binding provisional measures." (emphasis
added)).
174. Methanex Corp. v. U.S., NAFTA, Final Award, Part IV, ch. B, 23-35 (Jan. 15, 2001),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf.
175. See, e.g., RAIMO SILTALA, A THEORY OF PRECEDENT- FROM ANALYTICAL POSITIVISM TO A
POST-ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4 (2000) (analyzing free judicial decision making); see also
RICCARDO GUASTINI, LE FONTI DEL DIRITTO E L'INTERPRETAZIONE (1993) (examining the sources of
law and their interpretation under a judicial decision making context).
176. See Ran Hischl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 AM. J.
COMP. L. 125 (2005).
177. Marcos A. Orellana, Science, Risk and Uncertainty: Public Health Measures and Investment
Disciplines, in NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 671, 788 (Philippe Kahn &
Thomas W. Walde eds., 2007).
178. See, e.g., Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. U.S., Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction, 77, n.34 (July 20, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
69499.pdf (referencing U.S national cases, U.S. v. Nancy, 189 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999) and Christoph
v. U.S., 931 F. Supp. 1564 (S.D. GA. 1996), to validate the concept that "a person may "incur"
expenses before he or she actually dispense any fund.").
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state, reference to its jurisprudence in order to clarify relevant provisions may be
made ipso jure.179 Questions arise with regard to reference to jurisprudence of
other national courts.1 80 Adopting a functionalist approach, some emphasize that
that the issue of regulatory expropriation, and other similar issues identified in
investor-state dispute settlement, initially emerged as "constitutional issue[s] in
national law."1 8 1 According to Walde and Kolo, the debate on regulatory taking in
the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court presents a constitutional character that
would make it "particularly apposite to serve as a laboratory - but also as relative
precedent - for the interpretative challenges" in international dispute
settlement. 182  The functionalist approach is based on the praesumptio
similitudini, 183 and holds that "[c]omparative constitutional law seems to provide
the most suitable analogy and precedent" to investor-state arbitration.
1 84
However, such a functionalist approach reduces the law to a formal technique
of conflict resolution denying its political underpinnings. The functionalists
deprive legal provisions of their systemic context and "integrat[e] them in an
artificial universal typology of 'solutions.' 185 Nonetheless, one of the main
features of investment arbitration is its detachment or separation from national
courts and their potential biases. From an international law perspective, investment
treaties do not amount to "constitutional charters"; rather, they institutionalize a
limited set of obligations to which sovereign states have voluntarily consented.
186
Also, it may be practically impossible to take the wide variety of national
jurisprudence into account. Ideally, an arbitral tribunal should make a thorough
survey of comparative law, making use of the scholarly work that has been done
on the issue in order to devise the most efficient legal system. But this does not
happen in practice. Usually only the laws of a small number of countries are
cited.187 Therefore, it may be difficult to eliminate cultural biases and possible
hegemonic thinking. For example, some authors have criticized reference to the
179. See A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, State Contracts in Contemporary International Law: Monist
Versus Dualist Controversies, 12 EuR. J. INT'L L. 309, 320 (2001).
180. For a seminal study on the importance of comparative law in international law and arbitration,
see HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1927).
181. Walde & Kolo, supra note 90, at 821.
182. Id. at 847.
183. Konrad Zweigert, Die "Praesumptio Similitudinis" als Grundsatzvermutung
rechtsvergleichender Method, in BUTS ET METHODS DU DROIT COMPARE/AIMS AND METHODS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 735 (M. Rotondi ed., 1973) (examining the "practice of similitude" as a
fundamental assumption of comparative law).
184. Walde & Kolo, supra note 90, at 822.
185. Frankenberg, supra note 63, at 411.
186. Gus V. Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 130 (2006).
187. See Nedim Peter Vogt, The International Practice of Law and the Anglo-Internationalization
of Law and Language, in FESTSCHRIFT LIBER AMICORUM TUGRUL ANSAY 455, 459 (Sabih Arkan &
Aynur Yongalik eds., 2006) (scrutinizing "advent of English as the Language of Law within the context
of the Anglo-Internationalization of the practice of law .... ); see also Frankenberg, supra note 185,
442 ("Despite all these claims that the comparatist be open-minded and think supra-nationally, the civil
and common law still rule over the comparatists' world.").
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US jurisprudence because this would be tantamount to rewriting other countries'
constitutional culture and experience.1 88 Somehow, drawing on the particular
constitutional experience of a country would re-politicize investment disputes,
against more neutral international canons. 189 Finally, one may question whether
this might amount to extraterritorial application of law.
In conclusion, as an eminent comparative law scholar pointed out, "[t]he
conscious and limited use of national legal traditions is advantageous in that it
enriches international law with useful source materials, analogies and
techniques."1 90 However, "preconceptions" are dangerous, and every case would
deserve ad hoc consideration. More than a century ago, Oppenheim warned that
"the science of international law must be careful in the appreciation of such
municipal case-law."1 91 If the applicable law is the law of the host state, of course
reference may be made to the administrative law and jurisprudence of the host
state. Where the applicable law is international law, reference to national cases
becomes a more sensitive issue which the arbitrators must decide. In any case, if
national precedents as well as international ones may be taken into account for the
persuasiveness of their ratio decidendi, they are not binding on international
arbitrators.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has focused on the use of the comparative method in international
investment arbitration. Comparison is a mode of thinking and is consistently used
in both literary and legal sources. While poets have the amplest freedom to
compare extremely different elements,19 2 lawyers need to follow strict rules. In
legal systems and investment arbitrations comparisons are consistently being
made; the phenomenon is far from new. Why then does it need to be scrutinized?
There are two main reasons for doing so. First, it seems that while comparisons
are made, they are often done without full awareness of their implications from a
systemic perspective. Second, although investment treaty arbitration has become
the most common method for settling investor-state disputes, some authors have
nonetheless harshly criticized it because of its alleged lack of human rights
188. E.g., David Schneiderman, NAFTA's Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to
Canada 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 499 (1996); David Schneiderman, Constitution or Model Treaty?
Struggling over the Interpretative Authority of NAFTA, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS
294 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006).
189. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 606-08.
190. LINDELL V. PROTT, THE LATENT POWER OF CULTURE AND THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE 230
(1979).
191. Lassa Oppenheim, The Science ofInternational Law: Its Tasks and Methods, 2 AM. J. INT'L L.
313, 336 (1908); Id at 338 (The author added: "I do not deny ... that the intrinsic value of many such
decisions and the convincing arguments which accompany them had their bearing upon courts of other
countries and thereby in fact made these cases precedents which are followed by the courts of all or
many other countries, but in law and per se they are and remain precedents for the judges of their own
country only.").
192. For instance, Shakespeare famously compared the beloved friend to a summer day. WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, SONNETS, SONNET XVIII.
VOL. 39:1
CRITICAL COMPARISONS
consideration. This paper has questioned whether the mechanism may actually
benefit from a wider use of comparative law.
Like any other kind of adjudication, consistent patterns, attitudes, values and
opinions characterize investment treaty arbitration. All these elements form what
may be called a legal culture.1 93 The culture of investment treaty arbitration
constitutes a sort of melting pot of different legal traditions as it presents mixed
characteristics of common law and civil law traditions. While previous studies
have focused on the procedural dimension of the phenomenon, this article has
focused on its substantive dimension. While other studies have compared the
different legal frameworks which regulate foreign investments at the national level,
this study has focused on the role of the comparative method in international
investment law and arbitration.
After scrutinizing arbitrators' use of comparative law in investment treaty
disputes, this paper critically assessed this approach. Arbitrators may use analogies
and judicial borrowing; this is part of legal reasoning and it is legitimate to do so,
in light of customary rules of treaty interpretation. According to these rules,
contextual interpretation is a legitimate tool of interpretation. Furthermore,
arbitrators may detect international principles of law through the analysis of
relevant jurisprudence of other courts and tribunals. However, they need to pay
attention to methodology issues. Judicial borrowing cannot be an uncritical
exercise. As many comparative lawyers well know, legal norms express a certain
political position,194 being the outcome of certain historical evolution.1 95 The case
selection and the selection of the tertium comparationis may affect the outcome of
the case.
This study highlights the fact that reference to national case law may be
problematic in consideration of extraterritorial character of such application and of
the risk of re-politicizing investment treaty disputes. National case law becomes
relevant where the applicable law is the lex loci. By contrast, reliance on
persuasive precedents of previous arbitral tribunals may lead to the coalescence of
different legal traditions and experiences and to an increased coherence of the
system. 196 As Lauterpacht pointed out, "[i]nternational arbitral law has produced a
body of precedent which is full of instruction and authority. Numerous arbitral
awards have made a distinct contribution to international law by reason of their
scope, their elaboration, and the conscientiousness with which they have examined
the issue before them."
' 19 7
193. See, e.g., LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 15
(1975); Roger Cotterell, The Concept of Legal Culture, in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES 13-14 (David
Nelken ed., 1997).
194. RENE RODIERE, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT COMPARE 4 (1979) (explaining that "les r~gles de
droit n'intdressent pas le comparatiste dans leur expression normative, mais tant qu'elles manifestent
une certain position politique" or as translated from French, "the comparatist is not interested in the
rules of law in their normative expression, but as they manifest a certain political position.").
195. Id.
196. McLachlan, supra note 115.
197. Paulsson, supra note 83, at 97 (citing HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
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In parallel, the increasing reliance on cases of other international courts and
tribunals may increase the perceived legitimacy of the system especially in cases in
which constitutional dilemmas are at stake. This comparative mood of arbitral
panels should not be read as arbitral activism or as articulation of free law doctrine,
but as an interpretative tool allowed for in customary rules of treaty
interpretation. 198 Furthermore, insofar as certain legal principles have become
norms of customary law they may be applied to the disputes as applicable law. In
conclusion, given the attitude of arbitral tribunals to borrow from the experience of
other courts and tribunals and the comparative trend of scholarly analysis, a more
conscious use of the comparative method needs to be promoted. Comparisons are
not a neutral or objective phenomenon: "[T]he comparativist has to regard herself
as being involved: involved in an ongoing social practice constituted and pervaded
by law; involved in a given legal tradition.. .; and involved in a specific mode of
thinking and talking about law." 199 Once aware of perspective, arbitral tribunals
and interpreters can make conscious use of the instruments of law. Not only would
such awareness limit eventual abuses of the comparative method, but it would also
favor the coherence of the international legal system. While investment law is
closely associated with what arbitrators say it is, the two are distinct: "[P]rior cases
provide evidence of the law, but they cannot be conclusive. 20 0
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 17-18 (1958).
198. Campbell McLachlan, Investment Treaties and General International Law, 57 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 361 (2008).
199. Frankenberg, supra note 63, at 443.
200. Peter Wesley-Smith, Theories of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis, in PRECEDENT
IN LAW 73, 80 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987).
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